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ANALYSIS: Washington's Disastrous Approach to Somalia

By Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
Apr 1, 2008 - 5:22:09 PM

As the situation on the ground in Somalia has moved from crisis to what
international and non-governmental humanitarian and human-rights agencies are
calling a "catastrophe," Washington's policy towards that country has plunged
from blunder to disaster.

What is Washington's policy towards Somalia? That question is difficult to
answer, because there might not be a policy at all, but an incoherent set of
tendencies instead. Disaster is a harsh, if not extreme word; it is used here
analytically and with regard for precision. What else do we call the results
when an actor with significant influence over events ends up not only failing
to achieve its objectives, but with an outcome that approximates its worst-case
scenario?

Washington, of course, does have an official policy for Somalia. Stung by
criticism that it was solely focussed on anti-terrorism, the U.S. State
Department issued a "Fact Sheet" in mid-March - coincident with its placing of
the al-Shabaab jihadists on its list of foreign terrorist organizations - in
which Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer insisted
that fighting terrorism was not Washington's sole priority, but was part of a
"comprehensive strategy" to reverse radicalization, encourage dialogue between
Somalia's contending political forces, and improve governance, rule of law,
democracy, human rights, and the country's economy. An essential component of
the strategy, she concluded, is to "isolate" those who "refuse dialogue and
insist on violence."

If those are, indeed, Washington's aims, rather than anti-terrorism packaged in
pious platitudes, there could be no greater distance between aspiration and
reality. Radicalization is on the rise in Somalia, with the primarily Islamist
armed opposition seizing towns throughout the country for the first time since
the Ethiopian occupation began at the end of 2006. There is no "governance" on
a national level; power has devolved to regions and localities that are often
split by competing factions. There is no functioning court system and Somalia's
high court is inoperative. There has been no progress toward democracy; the
transitional parliament has not begun work on a constitution that is essential
if, as projected, elections are to be held in 2009 - indeed, the parliament has
not acted at all since it approved the cabinet list of Somalia's new prime
minister, Nur "Adde" Hassan Hussein, prompting its speaker, Adan Madobe, to
threaten to resign. Human-rights organizations and journalists document human-
rights abuses committed by Ethiopian and government forces on a regular basis.
Somalia's economy is declining, plagued by drought, hyper-inflation, internal
displacement, continued impairment of commerce, and violent conflict. Dialogue
between the transitional government and its political oppositions has failed to
get off the ground, because the oppositions demand that Ethiopian occupation
forces withdraw from Somalia before they enter negotiations, and the militant
jihadis forswear discussions altogether. Far from being isolated, the militants
of al-Shabaab collaborate with the other oppositions militarily against the
occupiers, although they have not gained widespread support for their program
of an Islamic state based on Shari'a law.

There is a number of possible reasons why such a yawning gap between rhetoric
and reality has opened up. Perhaps Washington is serious about its professed
goals and dedicated to achieving them, but the situation in Somalia is simply
too intractable to allow for success. If so, far from being the world's only
"super-power," the United States is powerless to begin to have its way, even in
a poor and vulnerable country. Perhaps Washington could do more, but Somalia is
low on its list of priorities and it is unwilling to expend the necessary
resources. If so, then its goals are simply rhetorical and it has decided to
live with its worst-case scenario. Perhaps Washington is cynical and has other
goals than the ones that it proclaims officially. If so, what are those goals?
Anti-terrorism stripped out of its comprehensive cocoon is surely one of them.
Or is Washington also eager to protect the interests of its ally in Addis
Ababa? Perhaps, finally, Washington is confused and ambivalent, and has no
coherent policy, rendering its action and inaction ineffectual and self-
defeating. If so, it is not a credible actor that can be trusted by the other
players.

Except for the first possibility - that Washington is doing everything that it
could do for Somalia (which was only posed to show its absurdity) - the others
are in some measure compatible. Somalia is low on Washington's agenda, given a
looming recession at home, panicky financial markets, entanglements in Iraq and
Afghanistan, a reported resurgence of al-Qaeda in Pakistan, nuclear issues with
Iran and North Korea, the rise of left populism in Latin America and efforts to
mediate the Israel-Palestine conflict. Washington is also probably disingenuous
about its "comprehensive" strategy, and is placing its major emphasis on anti-
terrorism and is unwilling to discipline Ethiopia, which prefers a divided
Somalia to a unified one that would not be its satellite. Most of all, however,
Washington is confused and ambivalent; it does not know what to do with a
catastrophe that it has in great part created and for which it refuses to bear
any responsibility.

The root of Washington's failure to act constructively in Somalia and, instead,
to undermine its own proclaimed interests and the interests of the Somali
people is a tension between a focus on anti-terrorism and a supposed commitment
to nation building, which encapsulates its other official goals. Curbing
terrorism and nurturing stable institutions are not, in principle,
contradictory aims, but they have become increasingly so in the particular
circumstances of contemporary Somalia.

From the moment that Washington gave its blessings to and assisted the
Ethiopian invasion and occupation of Somalia in the name of anti-terrorism, it
both excluded itself from being a partner in nation building and insured that
it would create the very "terrorist" movement that it was pledged to prevent.
That judgment is not made from hindsight, but was expressed by a host of
political leaders, journalists, analysts and Somali intellectuals from the
outset, including the present writer. It was obvious that using an occupation
force from a rival state to prop up a weak and divided transitional government
that lacked legitimacy would cause Somalia to fragment politically and would
spawn a liberation movement with an Islamic revolutionary component - just as
happened in Iraq after the United States invaded and occupied that country.
By backing Addis Ababa, Washington could not play the role of honest broker and
has since then simply dithered, allowing a catastrophe to unfold under the
watchful eyes of the surveillance aircraft that it constantly flies over
Somalia, one of which crashed at the end of March, documenting the practice
conclusively. (The plane went down in the Lower Shabelle region, where
Ethiopian forces were conducting search operations for "terrorist bases" - they
failed to find any.)

A brief sketch of Washington's reported actions during March shows a scenario,
which - were it not so grim - could pass for a comedy of blunders. At the
beginning of March, U.S. forces fired a missile into a house in the town of
Dhobley in the Lower Jubba region targeting one or more "terrorists." According
to different reports, three women were killed and/or injured in the attack,
along with livestock, but no terrorists were hit. U.S. Defense Department
spokesman, Bryan Whitman, announced: "As we have repeatedly said, we will
continue to pursue terrorist activities and their operations wherever we may
find them." Opposition spokesman Sheikh Mukhtar Robow replied: "Americans
bombed the town and hit civilians thinking that they were Islamist hideouts."
Even United Nations Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon, who normally follows
Washington's lead, criticized the raid, saying that it might lead to an
escalation of hostilities.

In mid-March, Washington placed the national-liberation and Islamic
revolutionary al-Shabaab movement on its list of foreign terrorist
organizations, allowing the U.S. to freeze the assets of any individual or
group supporting the jihadists. Analysts agreed that the designation would have
no material effect, because al-Shabaab receives little, if any, backing from
U.S. citizens; but that - as Steve Bloomfield of the British newspaper The
Independent put it - it will "derail any hope of a negotiated solution." Robow
responded to the terrorist listing by welcoming it and warned: "We were not
terrorists. But now [that] we've been designated, we have been forced to speak
out and unite with any Muslims on the list against the United States." Frazer
was reduced to saying that many Somalis with a "nationalist agenda" are "not
aware of how strong the al-Shabaab links with al-Qaeda are." Her remarks were
nuanced by former diplomat and now professor, David Shinn, who characterized al-
Shabaab to Voice of America as "the point of the spear," but not the whole
insurgency, adding that some of its members have ties to al-Qaeda, but
"certainly not all of them." Shinn concluded: "But there's just enough of a
connection there ... that I think this was the element that caused the United
States to put al-Shabaab on this list."

Towards the end of March, Washington's ambassador to the U.N., Zalmy Khalilzad,
announced that it was too early to contemplate sending a U.N. peacekeeping
force into Somalia to replace the under-staffed and ill-equipped African Union
mission, and to allow for an Ethiopian withdrawal. Rumors flew that Washington
was negotiating on peace talks with the political opposition, the Alliance for
the Re-Liberation of Somalia, in Nairobi. Rumors also flew that the State
Department had sent a team to assess an airstrip in the self-declared Republic
of Somaliland for possible military use, and that Frazer was working to
persuade African states to recognize Somaliland's independence.Somaliland's
president, Dahir Riyale Kahin, was quoted as saying: "If the U.S. wishes to
have a presence in Somaliland, we will welcome them and accept them."
All of the events of March betoken ineptitude and confusion. Far from isolating
the "terrorists," Washington succeeded in increasing their prestige and
damaging its own credibility. If, indeed, Washington is making overtures to
Somaliland, following earlier official diplomatic exchanges, it is undermining
the transitional institutions, which are based on the principle of a unified
post-colonial Somalia, and alienating Somali nationalists. Washington might
also be giving false hope to Somaliland, but, then again, it might genuinely be
changing its strategy. Without taking sides for or against Somaliland's
international recognition,it is clear that Washington's current equivocations
are a sign of a dangerous indecisiveness. As for negotiating with the
opposition, Washington is unlikely to make any headway as long as it fails to
come up with a commitment to Ethiopian withdrawal. A U.S. journalist who - for
good reason - must remain anonymous, has told this writer that State Department
officials complain that they talk to opposition leaders who make encouraging
promises and then fail to follow through. That would only make sense in light
of Washington's ambivalent disposition.

It becomes increasingly apparent that Washington's blunder was to bless the
Ethiopian occupation and to fail to negotiate seriously with the Islamic Courts
movement when it controlled most of south-central Somalia. Disaster in Somalia
and for U.S. interests in stabilizing the Horn of Africa proceeds from
continuing to back the occupation, which has been brutal and unpopular. If
Washington is to salvage anything from this disaster, it must arrange for an
Ethiopian withdrawal, whether or not Addis Ababa's forces are replaced by an
adequate international security force, and it must stop its own meddling in
Somalia's conflicts. Its concentration should be on helping in the provision of
humanitarian aid, and it should give Somalis breathing space to work through
their incredibly complex web of conflicts.

Are Washington and the Western powers that have fallen into following its lead
capable of resolving those conflicts or are they inhibiting conflict resolution
by their interference? Can they really contribute to solving the question of
Somaliland's status? Do they have a coherent position on what is to become of
Puntland? Are they willing to give Nur "Adde" the material and diplomatic
support that he needs to achieve the "open reconciliation" that they have
insisted that he pursue? Do they have a plan for what should happen if the
transitional institutions fail to write a constitution, as will likely be the
case, voiding the possibility of elections in 2009? Will they arrange yet
another conference to create yet another transitional government? Do they have
any power or will to aid in overcoming Somalia's severe regional and local
fragmentation? Can they curb al-Shabaab by "isolating" it?

Simply to pose those questions shows how little power the external actors have
as long as they treat Somalis as wards of the "international community."
Washington has placed itself in the role of a negligent warden depending on
abusive guards. It is not a pretty picture and it will not change until Somalis
are released from captivity.

In mid-March, Shinn appeared before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, where he remarked that in the absence of a "national unity"
government in Somalia, an Ethiopian withdrawal "would result in even more chaos
in Mogadishu than exists now." Can we be sure of that? How much more "chaos"
can there be? If the jihadis are to be "isolated," might that not be more
likely to happen if they cannot march under the banner of national liberation?
How much worse could the humanitarian catastrophe become if a brutal occupation
that has been instrumental in causing it is removed? Somalia has already
returned to its pre-Courts condition of devolution, but now it is also under an
occupation that has sparked an insurgency with an Islamic revolutionary
component; would it really be more chaotic if the occupation was removed?
If Somalis were given some breathing space, they might at least find out the
relative strength of the political forces in their fractured society and then
they might be able to settle on the structure of a political community or
several political communities. It is unlikely that al-Shabaab would come out on
top in such a process.

It is also unlikely that external actors will give Somalis breathing space.
They are addicted to trying to exert control half-heartedly; they are guilty of
gross negligence, especially so the "world's only super-power," which plays the
part of the proverbial "gang that can't shoot straight."

Report Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University
weinstem@purdue.edu